its national borders (Merabet & Gendreau, 2006) there always have been people somewhere in Europe, too. The region of Kayes, in the west of Mali, knows a long history of migration to France (see Manchuelle, 1997) . But in Yanfolila, there was no tradition of going to Europe, and the people I talked to referred to those who in the nineties sent messages that they were doing well, some of them had already come back as successful migrants, having earned much more money than it was ever possible in Ivory Coast. It were these stories that atracted more of those young men, but probably not only these stories, but also the growing political diiculties in Ivory Coast, where the public opinion was heated against the migrants from Mali or Burkina Faso, soon turning into open aggression and resulting in about at least 50.000 refugees arriving in Mali (Irin News, 2003) . Also, the young men did not come from all towns and villages: around Yanfolila, there are villages where many men went north and others where people stayed. It is not possible to trace back the reasons for these decisions, as they are neither linked to the economic status nor to education, but rather seem to be linked to the way stories about migration are told and efected opinions and decision making in the complex social structures of Malian households. What can be stated is that it were not the very poor who went. Not the absolute lack of food or goods was triggering migration, rather the expectations of earning good money, of making a leap forward economically, and of making a special experience, and being able to tell about it ater return. "s in Kayes, also in southern Mali the notion of aventure, adventure, is closely related to migration, though in Yanfolila stories about migration to Europe were about Spain, not France. Estrecho between Morocco and Spain by then was already heavily controlled by Spanish ships and warning systems 2 , and the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla were about to become the main destination for many Sub-Saharan migrants.
Most of the people from Yanfolila started with few money only, and mostly made the way to Morocco on their own, sparing the money for coxers, migrant smugglers that ofered assistance in transport and in circumventing border patrols.
But there on the shore, or just outside the Spanish enclaves, the easy way ended for most of the young men from Yanfolila. They had to hide from Moroccan police, they had to invest into boat owners ofering the transfer to Spain, and most 2 On the situation at Spanish sea borders and the working of the electronic surveillance system SIVE see e.g. Carling (2007) ; Deutsche Welle (2007) .
cadernos de estudos africanos • julho-dezembro de • , -of them had to try it several times. So they called their families back home to send money for the fare, and got it. Repeatedly they invested into transfers, and while some arrived in Spain, some disappeared and probably drowned, and some did not succeed even ater several atempts. They spent two, three or more years in Morocco, oten more than once caught by Moroccan police and deported to the Algerian border, then making their way back to the West. Mohamed 3 was deported four times to the border town of Oujdah, and four times made his way back to Tangier or Rabat by foot, travelling mostly by night. Some were successful in entering Ceuta or Melilla, overcoming the fences, Moroccan police and the Spanish Guardia Civil. Some were not, and inally were deported back to "amako. 
Migration as a mater of security
The notion of security, atributed to a complex topic as migration, has a number of connotations. First of all, security is linked to the reasons for migration.
Be it civil wars or natural disasters, forced migration happens because the living conditions degrade and do not allow a secure life in the home region of a migrant 4 . Refugees exist because of a lack of security. In a slightly more comprehensive way, a security gap may exist also for migrants who leave their home because life is becoming increasingly diicult and precarious. " family that sends one or more of its sons to other countries does so to secure the living of the family by income diversiication, or to secure a certain standard of living. This perhaps is less an absolute but a relative form of experiencing a lack of security 5 .
Then, as migration itself might be a risk, the notion of security can be applied to the ways migrants take, how they embark on their "journey", which may expose them to many dangers, as well as to the conditions they ind in the country of destination. A higher number of migrants live under irregular living and working conditions, with higher risks to sufer from exploitation, to risk accidents and illnesses, and inally risking deportation, too.
3 Mohamed is the son of a trader in the town of Yanfolila, whom I irst met there in .
4 See the list of forced migration categories from the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM) (www.forcedmigration.org). 5 A note on migration and protection. In this article, the term "migrant" denominates persons migrating without addressing the reasons why. The distinction between labour migrants and refugees is a much debated issue and relates to the diferent questions of security. The notion of mixed lows indicates the diiculties of dealing with migration before a protection status is determined. If persons are in need of protection becomes a crucial question when it comes to the control of entry to potential receiving countries, as asylum seekers should have access, while access for labour migrants may be denied.
Finally, when it comes to security related to migration, the overwhelming context is not risks of migration, but the danger that is atributed to migrants themselves (the security of migrants within this context is addressed as "human security" 6 ). This talk about security is to talk about ways to secure potential destination countries against the threat of irregular, or beter, unauthorised migration (Carling, 2007, 5f ). The nexus of security and human security, of defending the sea borders against the threat of an "invasion" and the need to rescue shipwrecked or stranded migrants dominates in oten contradictory ways the discourse on European migration management. Especially because the intensity of political discourse is not matched by immigration numbers (e.g. de Haas, 2007) , it might be beter not to call it a security discourse, but rather a discourse of securitization.
Securitization denominates a speech act by which a security threat is established in public discourse, even if there is no or few evidence (Buzan, Waever & de Wile, 1998 Kapirovsky, exhausting itself by repeating the same issues over and over again in countless working groups 9 . Thus, European migration management at "amako is far from being efective. This is true not only for the national eforts undertaken by France and Spain, but as well for the European Union to enhance its capacities in migration management. The pilot project of a labour recruitment centre, initially meant as a step as well innovative as progressive, was blocked by member states and the CIGEM was reduced to a mere information point 10 . The low practical relevance of migration management -in contrast to the importance the topic is given in political debates -is mirrored as well by the poor inancing. Only one percent of the over- Maghreb countries agreed to serve as a cordon sanitaire preventing Sub-Saharan migrants to pass their territory, and to cooperate closely with European forces.
It has been reported that the Spanish Guardia Civil not only holds a control post at Nouadhibou, Mauritania, but also patrols, together with Mauritanian security forces, the beaches and coastal towns. Mauritania arrests migrants from Mali and other countries despite bilateral contracts on free movement, keeps them in a detention camp inanced by Spain, and inally deports them back to a place close to Nioro on the border to Mali 11 .
There are few stories on these practices; one has to trace the stories of single migrants telling their struggle against the joint eforts of security forces to prevent migration, and to rely on the few reports available. The big story about migration and European migration control is told more in the north, and it is a story about the sea, the Mediterranean, more than a story about the desert. And, though single European member states, especially Italy and Spain, are strongly engaged in this story, it is the European agency Frontex which is at centre stage.
The Mediterranean Sea, a batleield?
In the late 1990s media started reporting stories about tourists stumbling across dead, black bodies on the hotel beaches in southern Spain 12 . Western vocabulary was enhanced by words like patera or cayuco, those small boats that migrants use to cross the Estrecho, the narrow strip of water between Moroccan and Spanish coasts. 12 Estimations difer, but according to Fortress Europe . migrants that died in the Mediterranean from to have been oicially registered. htp //fortresseurope.blogspot.com/ / /immigrants-dead-at-frontiersof-europe_ .html narrative deals with migration as a threat of illegal intruders, condemning transport as human traicking, against which an increasingly sophisticated combination of measures was put into place to prevent migrants to arrive at European borders. Vessels, airplanes and helicopters search with radar and even satellite support for immigrant boats, metal and electronic fences rise to the sky, keeping of the intruders. Over the past years, especially Italy and Spain, but also other European nations and the EU itself tried to integrate northern African states into the deterrence and defence against migrants. Morocco, Libya, Mauritania and Algeria meanwhile stop and arrest Sub-Saharan migrants, and frequently deport them back, though oten only to their southern borders, which means plain desert. Furthermore, Mauritania, Libya or Senegal allow European forces to operate within their sovereign waters, which serves to efectively turn migrant boats back to "frican shores right ater they started their journey. Once the boats arrive in international waters, the European marines face a dilemma. First, they are not allowed to turn migrants boats back by force, and secondly, oten the persons on the boats have to be rescued from drowning, and, according to international sea law, have to be brought to the nearest oten European safe harbour. Once within European territory, migrants have the right to apply for asylum, which hinders their immediate deportation. Deportation is complicated, too, because only few migrants can display documents, so the country of origin oten is diicult to establish and even more diicult to prove. So the return of unwanted migrants close to the African shores where they embark is the central aim of European migration management, and thus of Frontex.
What is Frontex?
Frontex (deriving from the French "Frontières extérieurs") is the short name The role of Frontex is, as it is said oicially, supportive, and coordinative.
Frontex provides for coordination of operational cooperation between Member
States in the ield of management of external borders. We strengthen border security by ensuring the coordination of Member States' actions in the implementation of Community measures relating to the management of the external borders. (Frontex, 2011, p. . "ctivities rose accordingly, as the igure below shows. 13 htp //www.frontex.europa.eu/origin_and_tasks/tasks/; see also IMI (2008; 
Areas of operation
Besides Eastern European land borders the Mediterranean and the West African shores are and will be the main areas for Frontex operations. In recent years, Frontex sea operations concentrated on the sea between Canary Islands and the African coast, the Strait of Gibraltar, the sea between Libya, Tunisia, Malta and the southern Italian islands, and the Greek Turkish border, focusing on Greek islands just ofshore the Turkish coast. Meanwhile, Frontex is seeking to establish an "European Patrols Network (EPN) that will cover the whole sea territory between Southern Europe and "frica see igure below .
Not astonishingly, Frontex operates in exactly the areas where distances between "frican and European territory are lowest and thus most atempts to cross the sea are to be expected. "s the image shows, the major operational ields did not change in 2010, but the extension of operational areas has been enlarged. Within these areas, Frontex staf cooperates closely with the forces of national border guards and marines, assisting with personnel and equipment from different EU member states. While a member state acts as leading operator of a joint project, Frontex does the coordination, organising material and staf. The equipment entails vessels, helicopters, airplanes and other materials (see Frontex action plan 2010). Increasingly Frontex aims at using satellites and drones for surveillance of operation areas (Monroy, 2010) . Though already equipped with extensive material and practical range, this situation does not it to the ambitious aims of Frontex. In spring Cecilia
Malström, EU commissioner for home afairs, presented a new drat regulation which has since been under discussion (EU Commission, 2010) . This new legal framework would enhance the possibilities of Frontex to take initiatives on its own, would stabilise its grip on staf and material, and would extend its competences far into third countries (Monroy, 2010) .
Migration and risk analysis
" task that is underlined in Frontex self-presentations is the ield of risk analyses:
At the heart of all activities of the Agency is carrying out risk analysis. . It is not the agency Frontex which will be the irst one to establish a realistic regard on immigration from the South, rather, it should be the European political organs, the commission, the parliament, the council. As long as these institutions hold up the myth of invasion from Sub-Saharan Africa, Frontex will be eager to act within the realms of this perspective, to enhance its competences and close the last gaps for immigrants, analysing tracks and traces of migrants and smugglers. For the migrants themselves this means a growing insecurity, as the closing of the easiest routes means that the longer, more dangerous and risky ways need to be chosen.
Mediterranean ping-pong
To address what is at stake in Frontex activities it may be useful to take a closer look on one of the operation ields, e.g. the sea within the political and geographical triangle Sicilia / Lampedusa, Malta, and Libya 17 . I will focus on this particular (Everyonegroup, 2011). regarding asylum and immigration between member states remained low 22 . The reception conditions are far below European standards, as well as the asylum procedure.
Italy and Malta try hard to guard their coastal seas against irregular migrants, and the two states meanwhile look back on a record of constant conlict on who is responsible for migrants detected in national or international waters. Malta frequently denies its responsibility to receive or save immigrants whose boats have been detected in the sea, arguing that boats are closer to Lampedusa and the closest harbour is an Italian one. Italy oten reacts in the same way, and also Libya has not been eager to accept migrants that are returned by European forces.
"s a most popular example for these atitudes we can recall the incident of Though Italy apparently dealt out with Libya common sea patrols also on Libyan territory, the central problem of the situation described above is the following: International law prescribes that shipwrecked persons have to be rescued and then brought to the closest harbour nearby. That means that the state to which this closest harbour belongs will have to take over responsibility for the migrants, process asylum claims, etc. All Mediterranean states are reluctant to do this, and therefore endanger the transit and inally even the rescue of mi- 23 That this is an ongoing practice shows the example of 114 refugees debarked from Libya and on 14 July taken over by the Spanish frigate "lmirante Juan de "orbón , acting within the N"TO mission Uniied Protector. Malta and Italy denied access, and ater several days it was Tunisia, not an European member state, that eventually accepted to take over the refugees (Jakob, 2011) . 24 An aspect that is not within the scope of this article, but is of major relevance for the situation in the Mediterranean is the deterrence of private ishermen to rescue shipwrecked migrants. "gainst numerous private ships, their captains and owners cases were iled because they rescued shipwrecked and tried to bring them to a European harbour. While fully in line with international sea law, the captains had to face trials, the ships have been blocked for years, procedures that reduced the safety of migrants because private ships became reluctant to help shipwrecked minding the consequences see Gleitze, Weinzierl & Lisson, , pp. f. Klepp, , .
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Why was Nautilus 2008 a failure?
Frontex entered the scene in 2006, conducting two operations, namely Migration low to Malta , which was the assistance of Maltese authorities with experts to identify the country of origin of arrived migrants, and "Nautilus", a joint sea operation with Spanish, Italian and Greek vessels and French and German planes and helicopters. Nautilus 2006 lasted only ten days in October, and was repeated in 2007 for four weeks in June and July. The operation was deemed to be successful, though the Frontex director mainly addressed the smooth cooperation between the joint forces 25 .
In 2008, according to a Frontex press communication, Nautilus was postponed because of diferences between cooperating member states The mission was on hold due to the diference of opinion concerning the responsibility of migrants saved at sea. "ter discussions rules regarding the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea during the operation will remain the same as in last year's operation. Migrants saved in the Libyan Search and Rescue Area (SAR) will be taken to Libya, when not possible to closest safe haven 26 .
Nautilus was stopped in October ater only ive weeks, and already in September 20 th Frontex director Laitinen declared that the mission had failed.
Laitinen stated that the Frontex operations did not lead to less, but to more migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean within the operational ield of Frontex, because the probability to be rescued by maritime forces was higher 27 . The central problem and reason for the failure of Nautilus however was not the rising number of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean, but the lack of cooperation of Libya. While Spain had established agreements with Senegal and Mauritania, and migrant boats were intercepted within coastal areas already or were sent back to the coast 28 , a similar cooperation was not possible with Libya. And, as ships sent back, 116 ships accompanied back, and a total number of migrants deterred at sea of 42.000 (Herzog, 2009, p. 7) 31 .
Colonnello TST Francesco Saverio Manozzi, executive head of the responsible Guardia di Finanza head quarters at Rome 32 , in an interview accuses Frontex forces of other nations, especially Germans, to follow a hard line in diverting migrants on the sea. On formal meetings, he stated, he had been confronted with operation plans and writen orders regarding the deterrence of migrants declaring to go on the migrants' boats and take patrol and food away and thus force them to turn back or proceed under this conditions (ibid.). This practice was not directly denied by Frontex director Laitinen.
If there are any means to turn those people back legally to their departure harbours, they will be applied. The diferent states diverge in interpreting international law and some are more decisive sending migrants back (Herzog, 2009, p. 9 ,
It is a fairly open question in how far these practices are legal. It is also to be questioned in how far the "diversion" of migrants to states like Libya 33 is legal according to the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the entailed non-refoulement imperative. Human rights organisations and UNHCR criticised these practices repeatedly, and "ndrjasevic states Every diversion is, seen from the Frontex perspective, in irst instance live saving. Asked by Herzog, Ilkka Laitinen states:
30 See htp //www.cissong.org/it/press/news/ 31 The same seems to be true for Malta, where government oicials tell about diverted migrants within Nautilus II, second phase, while commanders operating within Frontex activities deny it (Klepp, 2010, p. 16 I know that there are cases in international seas, where we try in irst instance to save lives by guaranteeing the safe way back to the harbours of departure. We make sure that life vests are on board, and that there is enough food, drinking water and fuel to return in safety. We describe the best way to solve the problem (Herzog, 2009, p. 9 In a study for the German Institute for Human Rights, Weinzierl and Lisson tackle with the diiculties of obligations within the diferent maritime operational zones. While within the territorial sea and the contiguous zone the Asylum Procedures Directive has to be applied and all asylum applications are to be examined, the directive has no application in the remaining high sea and foreign territorial sea. But even there, protection issues arise for Frontex or EU member state forces because of the applicability of the Schengen Borders Code.
The provisions of the Schengen Borders Code with which human rights obligations at border controls are concerned are not diferentiated according to where the border controls take place. Therefore the obligations of Member States under EU law, arising from the Schengen Borders Code, to protect the rights of refugees and persons seeking international protection, especially with regard to non-refoulement, also extend to border controls conducted on high seas and the territorial sea of third states (Weinzierl & Lisson, 2007, p. 57) .
The authors are unequivocal in the conclusion that the international law of the sea obliges government ships that carry out rescues to bring the shipwrecked to a safe place, and the notion of safe place includes the non-refoulement. This implies that the handing over of migrants and refugees to Libyan forces or the sending back of intercepted migrants to Libya is illegal.
Duties also exist with regard to mixed groups of migrants who are not on a state ship, but are encountered in the course of border and migration controls, or actions of rescue at sea. It is recognised that, as a rule, boats contain not exclusively, but also persons in need of international protection. In light of this fact, grounds always exist to assume that the escorting or towing back of a boat to states outside the EU could result in grave violations of human rights. Thus it is incompatible with human rights for state ships engaged in border protection or rescue at sea to force migrant ships with migrants to sail to third countries (Weinzierl & Lisson, 2007, p. 70) .
As until now neither member states nor Frontex have the competence not even for an accelerated border procedure for refugee status determination, intercepted or rescued migrants have to be brought to EU territory to guarantee protection.
Law enforcement -against Frontex?
Until today no case is taken against Frontex activities. This is, for a number of reasons, not astonishing. First, for potential claimants access to European territory is denied, and e.g. in Libya they are confronted with other problems than iling a claim against Frontex. Secondly, it is not at all clear at which court such an action could be taken. Joint Frontex operations act under the leadership of one member state, having staf from diferent nation states on ships of again different nationality, operating in open seas or territorial waters. Not only from the perspective of a shipwrecked migrant, it is diicult to decide who is to blame and at which court.
Frontex itself denies all responsibility, as it only coordinates, and the participating member states are responsible and obliged to operate legally (Kasparek, 2009 about what happens at sea, and there never will be some" (Herzog, 2009, p. 8 Tinzawaten and Bamako. Several are in need of medical treatment; some are seriously disturbed and need mental health assistance. The stories these migrants tell are full of despair, broken dreams, they are about not knowing where to go and not knowing how to gather the money to get back home or to head north once again.
The young men of Yanfolila, ater they arrived ater deportation, stayed only few days in Bamako, gathered money for the bus ticket from local relatives and then made their way back to Yanfolila or to the village. The reception on their return was twofold. On the one hand, the pictures and stories about migrants drowning or being shot on the fences, or dying in the Sahara had arrived in Yanfolila, too. Many people knew what the returnees had endured and listened to the stories they had to tell. The young returnees formed an association based on the experiences of their return, and acted as facilitators in a government campaign informing about the risks of irregular migration, and thus earned a certain reputation. On the other hand, they had returned with empty hands, had nothing to bring back as their adventures, and nothing can be worse. Migration in Mali is linked to upward mobility, within the family, within the village. A migrant, and a migrant from Europe even more so, is expected to bring back money, which adds to his mother's status within the family, and to the status of his family in the neighbourhood. " return ater successful migration is seen as passage to the status of a real adult and responsible member of the family. The migrant who fails is nothing. He is regarded as a youngster, and is object of jokes and sneering. The stories of adventures helped, but could not outweigh the shame and the debts. Most of the migrants' families were heavily indebted because they spent a fortune on migration. In some cases, this was not mentioned any more, in others, especially in households where the father had more than one wife, the migrant has to repay all these expenses, a debt that lasts as a heavy burden on his future.
The returnees reintegrated, but despite their age on a lower level than before their departure. And some were lost: not only those who drowned in the sea or 36 Cimade, Médecins du Monde, and Medico International.
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All this is discussed in the small villages and in the town of Yanfolila, and in the same way the stories about rich migrants (and the new houses that were built with migrants' money) nourished new migration, the stories of failed migrants and their fate deter other young men to head for Europe, though there will be always some who will ind their ways.
This is the preliminary end of a journey which started long ago, an efect of European migration management far outside the European borders. Having often a relative insecurity as a point of departure, this is transformed through migration into an almost absolute lack of security. While the return of the young men from Yanfolila was eased by the public discourse on what they had to endure on their journey, today countless failed migrants gather in "amako, oten in situations close to social death, rejected by their families or feeling too ashamed to return with empty hands. This growing number of failed migrants, the money spent and spoiled on migration, probably does neither enter into Frontex risk analyses nor the consciousness of European policy makers when talking about the beneits of migration and development. Even at "amako, the fate of failed migrants is rarely a topic of public discourse. Few self-organisations of returnees struggle to inluence the public opinion and political arena, but talking about failure is not popular in Mali, and many failed migrants rather hide than gather.
